The manager of an Indian business group (BG) fund can have access to private information on its own BG firms and their industries. However, since the fund belongs to a BG, the fund manager may also have incentives to undertake investments that benefit the BG firm managers and not its fund investors. In this paper, we examine the relation between a business group (BG) mutual fund's return performance and its ownership levels in (i) its own BG firms, and in (ii) the rivals of its BG firms that operate in the same industries. Using return and portfolio holdings data on a survivorship-bias free sample of Indian BG mutual funds for the period 2002 -2010 we find that the relation between a BG fund's risk-adjusted returns and its ownership in its own BG firms or firms in BG industries is roughly in the form of an inverted "V," i.e., funds underperform whenever they increase or decrease their investment in group firms or rival firms beyond what a typical fund invests in these firms. The effect is stronger for underinvestment. This finding for BG firms suggests opportunistic behavior on the part of the BG fund manager.
Introduction
A typical Indian mutual fund is at the tail of an organizational hierarchy which starts with a mutual "fund sponsor." A fund sponsor, according to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Mutual Funds) Regulations of 1996, is "any person who, acting alone or in combination with another body corporate, establishes a mutual fund."
1 A unique feature of the Indian mutual fund industry is that many of these fund sponsors are business group (BG) families. These business group families (BGs) have significant ownership in a large number of firms that operate in several industries. For example, the Aditya Birla Group operates approximately 40 companies, many of which are listed on the major exchanges, and span such diverse sectors as fibers, metals, cement apparel, chemicals, fertilizers, telecom, and information technology. In addition to these, this group also operates in the financial services sector and owns the Birla Sun Life Asset Management Company Ltd., which is the investment manager for Birla Sun Life
Mutual Fund that operates dozens of mutual funds, or schemes as they are referred to in India.
The fact that BGs own exchange-listed firms and also operate mutual funds has two major implications. First, the manager of such a BG fund is likely have access to private information about firms that are owned by her BG as well as superior information of the industries in which these BG firms operate. This information may result from the manager's personal knowledge or experience interacting with these BG firms and their industries; or the manager may be part of a social or professional network that includes managers from these BG firms and industries. If the manager indeed has this informational advantage, then she can use it improve the wealth of her fund investors by generating superior returns to the BG fund she manages. She can either invest a larger portion of her assets under management (AUM), or a smaller portion, depending on whether she anticipates good or bad information on her group firms. Similarly she can exploit informational advantage on industry prospects by overweighting or underweighting other firms that operate in the same industry as the BG firms. In terms of an empirically testable hypothesis, this informational advantage would imply that the fund would generate superior (appropriately risk-adjusted) returns by deviating from the investment levels of a typical fund.
Alternatively, the BG fund manager may also utilize the fund's assets to trade in her BG firms' stocks for opportunistic motives that do not necessarily benefit the investors in her fund but rather help the management of the BG firm. The BG fund manager's opportunistic motives can arise for a variety of reasons including loyalty to her BG family or her own career concerns.
The fund manager can take several actions that can benefit the management of the BG firm. For example, the fund manager may overweight BG firms' stocks in her fund portfolio when the BG firm is to release unfavorable information in order to support the BG firm's stock price. If opportunistic motives prevail, then overinvestment in BG firms (as compared to a typical mutual fund) by BG funds should result in inferior risk-adjusted performance to the detriment of the BG fund's investors.
It is difficult to imagine opportunism to be a motive for under investment in group firms' stocks unless such an underinvestment is necessary to free up capital to be invested in the group firms' debt. The reason that this could be possible is because SEBI regulations prohibit investment in listed securities of group companies beyond 25 percent of a fund's net assets.
Listed securities include stocks as well as corporate bonds and other forms of debt that companies issue and are traded in the country's two premier exchanges, the BSE and the NSE. 2 Though we find that the SEBI-imposed cap is not even close to being binding for stock investments, we are unable to test whether they become binding once debt investments are included for want of data on debt investments.
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In this paper, we explore the above issues in detail using return and portfolio holdings data for a large survivorship-bias free sample of Indian BG mutual funds over the period 2002 -2010 . In particular, we examine the relation between BG fund's return performance and its level of investments (i) in its own BG firms, and (ii) in the rivals of its BG firms in their industries. 4 Since some of the BG firms and its rivals are large and sought after by non-BG fund managers as well, we use an excess investment measure that controls for investment in these firms by an average mutual fund in the industry. We use several risk-adjusted measures for returns including style or characteristic benchmark-adjusted returns as proposed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) as well as the traditional 4-factor alpha proposed by Carhart (1997) .
We find that the relation between a BG fund's risk-adjusted returns and its ownership in its own BG firm stock is roughly in the form of an inverted "V," i.e., both positive (over investment) and negative (under investment) excess investment yields negative risk-adjusted returns for the fund. The impact of under investment on returns is stronger and a BG fund would lose as much as 15 basis points a month for every 1 percent under investment in their own group 2 The third exchange, MCX-SX, commenced trading in stocks only in February 2013 after our sample period. 3 We have heard anecdotal evidence that opportunistic investment in debt of group firms is prevalent among Indian mutual funds. 4 We have recently become aware of Anagol and Pareek (2013) who present evidence on the relation between a BG fund's ownership in the industries where its own BG firms operate and its performance. Using data from Morningstar for the period 2003 -2013, they find a positive relation between a BG fund's excess return (over a riskfree rate) and the funds excess (over the market portfolio weight) ownership in BG firm industries. The authors attribute this positive association to BG fund managers' private information. They do not consider the BG fund managers opportunistic motives.
stock. While the loss due to over investment can be attributable to opportunistic motives on the part of the fund manager, it is not clear how to interpret the loss due to under investment.
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We also find similar evidence for a BG fund's investments in industry rivals of its own BG firms. Though there is a strong positive association between the fund's return and its investment in rival firms, it is mostly driven by the relationship between under investment and under performance. A BG fund underperforms to the tune of 4 basis points when it underinvests in its rival stocks by 1 percent relative to an average fund. Unlike investment in its own group stocks, it is more difficult to attribute this result to opportunism of the fund manager since there are no SEBI regulations that restrict investment in rival firms. The only other possibility could be is that fund managers may not want to be seen investing in rival stocks to protect their career concerns especially when the rival stocks is doing well. We see some evidence of this in the time series patterns of excess investments of different fund families (Figure 1 ).
To determine whether the fund performance can be attributed to the performance of the underlying group stocks and their rivals, we examine the relationship between excess investment and stock performance. Group stocks in which the BG funds under invest outperform the market index by 1.29 percent in the month when the underinvestment happens suggesting that such an underinvestment is either due to poor stock selection by the fund manager or due to cap constraints that require them to replace stocks with debt. Similar results are seen with underinvestment in rival stocks suggesting that BG fund managers view their own stocks and rivals not differently.
5 We are currently working on appending debt investments data to test whether underinvestment in stocks was compensated by over investment in debt.
We also investigate the determinants of a BG fund's excess ownership in its own BG firms and rivals. We find that BG funds degree of investment concentration is largely unrelated to its excess investment in own BG firms but is positively related with excess investment in rival firms. Finance literature (Kacperszyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) ) suggests that greater investment concentration indicates superior ability/effort on the part of the fund manager. Thus our findings support the earlier interpretation that BG fund managers invest more in their own BG firms for reasons unrelated to their ability while their underinvestment in rival firms suggest poor ability to pick stocks.
Our research adds to the growing literature on the activities and practices of business groups in general and Indian business groups in particular. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) NAVs. This implies that the NAV of the growth scheme is the sum of the NAV of the dividend scheme and the dividend payout. Therefore, the appropriate unit for our analysis is the Fund and we focus on the portfolios of only the growth schemes, but use the AUM for the total of all the schemes under the same Fund name. The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to calculate gross fund returns directly from NAVs without having to adjust for dividends or bonuses.
Data Sources
Our analysis covers all equity mutual funds that were available for investment in The Prowess database from CMIE is also the source for our data on business groups. Finally, we obtain size, book-to-market, momentum, and market factor returns for Indian stocks from
Professor Sandy Lai (see Eun, Lai, de Roon, Zhang (2010)).
Variable Descriptions
All prices and values are in the Indian currency Rupee (Rs Table 1 presents the summary statistics (mean, median, minimum, and maximum) for all the above variables for both BG and non-BG funds, categorized by fund characteristics, fund returns, portfolio holdings and excess investment in their group firms and rival firms. Note that excess investment variables in the last category are not defined for non-BG funds. The table also presents findings from t-tests (Kruskall-Wallis tests) for differences in means (medians) of BG and non-BG funds. For space considerations, we do not report the actual statistics from these tests but denote by "stars" those means and medians that are statistically significantly greater than the corresponding means and medians for the BG/non-BG sample at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence intervals.
Results

Summary Statistics and Findings from Univariate Analyses
There are some distinguishing characteristics of BG funds as compared to their non-BG counterparts. The size of the BG mutual fund families is almost twice as that of non-BG fund families though the average fund size of BG funds (Rs. 572 crores) is only slightly greater than that of non-BG funds (Rs. 468 crores). The average BG fund is also younger (62 months compared to 71 months for non-BG funds) and has a statistically significantly higher expense ratio. The values in Table 1 indicate that, as compared to non-BG funds, BG funds have higher net inflows, higher benchmark-adjusted return, lower equity holdings, higher investments in small and mid-caps investments but lower investments in large-size firms, and a lower investment concentration index.
The table also highlights that the average (median) investment by a BG fund in firms belonging to its BG is 2.01% (0.00%), in its own BG industries is 24.68% (18.14%), and 22.81%
(16.92%) in its rival firms. The mean and median values for the excess of these investments as compared to a typical fund are, as expected, small though there is some dispersion as seen in the minimum and maximum values. Table 2 presents the summary statistics by each BG fund family. Except for the fund net inflow, fund characteristics, returns and portfolio holdings vary widely and significantly among the eight families. There is a reasonable skewness in fund family size with Family 3 larger by several orders of magnitude than Family 5, the smallest family in the group. There are distinct return performance differences across the 8 families though most of them are negative when riskadjusted measures are considered. The funds' portfolio holdings are more similar than their returns though there seems to be a variation in the investment concentration index.
The variation in funds' gross and excess investments is probably the most striking.
Family 1 has around 57% of its AUM invested in either its group firms or their rivals while Families 7 and 8 have only around 12% of AUM invested. Gross investment in rival firms, in general, is substantially larger than similar investment in group firms. Interestingly, three out of eight families do not invest in their group firms on average while every family seems to invest a substantial part of their assets on group rivals. Also, while Family 3 overinvests in their group firms (by 1.49%), they underinvest in their group rivals (by 0.13%). Funds belonging to Family 2 do exactly the opposite -they under invest in their group firms (-0.70%) and over invest in their rivals (1.37%). Interestingly, Family 3 outperforms Family 2 in every return measure, suggesting that holdings in group and rival firms may influence fund returns.
Figure 1 provides the time series variation in excess investment in own group firms and rival firms for each of the fund families. We do not include Family 8 as they do not have any excess investment in own group firms. It is apparent that fund families differ in their strategies to invest in group firms and rival firms. While Family 3 has always followed a contrarian approach by overinvesting in group firms and underinvesting in rivals for most of the sample period, other families such as Family 1 and 2 follow a mixed strategy wherein they selectively overinvest or underinvest. Our later analyses, therefore, include explicit fixed fund family fixed effects to control for these differences across families.
We present the yearly variation in returns and flows for BG and non-BG funds in Table   3 . Though there are no major differences in fund flows and returns across BG and non-BG funds overall, there are clear differences during certain years. For example, BG funds underperform compared to non-BG funds in each of the post-financial crisis years in their characteristic benchmark-adjusted returns. Similarly, BG funds outperform non-BG funds in every return measure in 2007 and experience greater net inflows as compared to non-BG funds. Like in the case of fund families before, we control for yearly variations by using year fixed effects in all our subsequent analyses.
While we have considered each mutual fund separately when it comes to their investment in group and rival firms, it is possible that there is herding among funds that belong to the same family. Funds that belong to the same family may all overinvest or underinvest in their group or rival firms at the same time. To determine that, we compute a fund herding measure that aggregates the percentage of family funds that overinvest and underinvest in a given stock in a given month, first across stocks and then across months in our sample. We aggregate both using without weights as well as with weights where we use market capitalization and AUM as weights for stock and fund aggregation respectively. As before, we examine over or under investing by comparing with investments made by an average mutual fund. There is little difference between equally-weighted and AUM-weighted herding measures suggesting that fund size does not matter when it comes to excess investment in group and rival firms. Interestingly, when we aggregate across stocks using market capitalization, the percentage of funds not investing in group/rival stocks falls dramatically suggesting that it is the smaller stocks within the business group that get little attention from their mutual fund subsidiaries. Also, we find variations across families that are consistent with patterns noticed in Figure 1 . Our results indicate that funds belonging to the same family tend more likely to underinvest or not invest together as compared with over investing in their group or rival firms.
BG Fund Performance and Ownership in Own Firms/Rivals
In this section, we report our findings on whether BG fund performance reflects BG fund managers' superior information about the firms in their own BG firms and/or in the industries in which their firms operate. We also recognize that a BG fund's ownership in its own firms may reflect agency problems where the investment is not based on superior information but to benefit the BG firm management. We examine three measures of fund performance: the fund's excess return over the benchmark stated by the fund, the fund's excess return over the style characteristic benchmark portfolio (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) and the 4-factor alpha (Carhart (1997)). Our predictor variables include two measures of fund ownership and several commonly used control variables. The first is the BG fund's excess investment in the firms belonging to its own BG, and the second is the excess ownership in the other firms in industries where its own firms operate, or rivals. Excess investment is computed as the difference between the BG fund's investment and the investment of an average fund in BG firm or rival stocks.
The control variables are the fund's expense ratio, its age, size, net monthly inflows, percentage of portfolio invested in mid-sized and large firms, percentage invested in foreign firms and indexes, the investment concentration index, lagged fund return, the total net inflow into all fund in the BG family, the number funds in the BG family, and dummy variables for year and BG Family to control for fixed effects. We also include a crisis dummy variable (for periods greater than September 2008) to capture the effect of the financial crisis that has affected the Indian mutual fund industry significantly. All significance tests use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are clustered at the fund level. Though we report results for fund's reported benchmark-adjusted returns, we focus more on the other two return measures as they are less likely to be gamed by the fund manager. There were 5,175 fund months used in the regression and the average adjusted R-square was around 7 percent, except for the 4-factor alpha regressions wherein it was 2 percent.
The coefficient on excess investment in own BG firms is positive in two of the three return regressions but is significant in only the 4-factor alpha regression. However, the coefficient on excess investment in BG rival firms is positive and significant in two of the three cases suggesting that fund performance does increase with greater investment in rival firms.
This positive association is consistent with the hypothesis that fund investors may be benefitting from BG fund managers' private information on their own firms and industries. Also note that the coefficient on the fund's investment concentration index, which is a measure of manager effort (Kacperszyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005)) is not significantly different from zero.
Among the control variables, the crisis dummy and the lagged return variable are statistically significant in all the three return regressions. Fund performance seems to indicate mild mean reversion as past month performance is negatively related to current month performance. The financial crisis seems to have reduced monthly fund performance by 3 percent when you adjust for style characteristics and by 59 basis points when you consider four-factor alphas. is important to separate over and under investment given that most of the funds within the same family tend to herd more so in underinvesting than in overinvesting in their group or rival stocks.
When both these variables are included in the specification, we can observe whether the relation with performance changes for more/less than typical investment in BG firms (rivals).
We present the regression results from using these split variables in Table 6 . As in Table   5 , results are presented for each of the three return measures separately. The positive relation between fund performance and excess investment in own group firms and rival firms seem to be primarily driven by the underinvestment part, indicating the funds underperform significantly when they underinvest in their group or rival firms. Note that the underinvestment variable is either negative or zero and the coefficient for this variable in the regression is positive and strongly significant. This means that greater the under investment (more negative the variable is), greater is the fund's underperformance. A one percentage increase in under investment by a BG fund relative to an average fund in its own group stocks results in a fall in fund's monthly performance by more than 15 basis points.
Why would funds choose to under invest in their own firms relative to their peer funds, especially when it translates to poorer fund performance? The answer may lie in regulatory restrictions that may cap a group fund's investments in all securities, and not just stocks, of their group firms. It could be opportunistic for a fund manager to divert more funds to invest in debt securities of its group firms and provide direct funding rather than indirectly invest in its stocks.
Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that this is reasonably prevalent in the Indian mutual fund industry. We are currently working to get data on debt investments as well to answer this question.
Interestingly, the over investment variable has a negative coefficient as well suggesting that overinvestment in own group firms leads to poor performance too. The separation of excess investment in own group firms into under and over investment leads to an interesting inverted 'V' shaped relationship between fund performance and excess investment. BG funds perform poorly when they increase or decrease their investment in group firms significantly compared to their peers.
The more puzzling result is on the effect of under and overinvestment in rival stocks on BG fund performance. Greater underinvestment in rival firms leads to greater fund underperformance while greater over investment has no significant impact on fund performance. Since funds underperform when underinvest in their group firm stocks or their rival stocks, it must be the case that these stocks must be performing better than expectations and are underrepresented in the BG funds' portfolios. To determine whether this is indeed the case, we examine the performance of BG firm stocks and their rivals when BG funds underinvest or overinvest in them. We take all BG firm stocks (and rivals) and group them into tertiles based on the degree of excess investment by BG funds: Low excess investment (characterized by high under investment), Medium and High excess investment (characterized by high over investment). We then compute the average and median monthly return of stocks in each tertile to see whether stocks that have greater underinvestment indeed perform significantly better. We use the excess return over the BSE 500 index to determine the stock's performance. Table 7 reports these results and as expected, stocks that are underinvested by BG funds tend to perform better than stocks that have been overinvested. Clearly this suggests that BG funds are leaving money on the table by choosing to underinvest compared to their peers.
Determinants of BG Fund Investments in Own BG Firms and Rivals
Next, we investigate whether there are aspects of the BG fund's decisions to invest in their own BG firms and their rivals that may explain the earlier results on the impact of these variables on fund performance. In Table 8 , we present the findings from regressing excess investment in own BG firms (Model 1) and in rivals (Model 2) on variables that may impact that decision. Excess investment in own BG firms and in rival firms relates negatively to fund age and investment in foreign firms/indexes. The coefficients on the investment levels in large firms, on fund inflows as well as on the investment concentration index are significantly positive only in the rival regressions. It is possible that the negative coefficient on the investment level in foreign/index is because the sum of all investments must sum to 100%. There is weak evidence that higher excess investments in BG rivals may be associated with fund manager quality.
In Table 9 , we present results from estimating a Tobit model of over and under investment in own BG firms and rivals. Recall that the positive excess investment (over investment) in own firms (rivals) equals excess investment in own firms (rivals) when it has positive values and is zero otherwise; the definition of negative excess investment (under investment) is analogous. Note that under investment variables have non-positive values. Thus, in order to estimate a Tobit, we multiply this variable by -1. Thus, a positive coefficient on a variable implies that an increase in that variable makes the excess investment more negative.
Columns one and two present the results for over and under investment in own BG firms while columns three and four present results for over and under investment in BG rivals. Given the construction of the dependent variables, if the sign on the coefficient in the two columns is opposite, the effect is the same for both positive and negative values. For example, the coefficient on fund age is negative in column 1 and positive in 2, which implies that an increase in fund age makes excess investment less positive and more negative, respectively.
The interesting cases are when the coefficients in the two columns have the same sign implying that the variable has opposite effects in the positive and negative ranges. Thus, funds expense ratio relates negatively with excess investment in own BG firms when it is positive and positively when it is negative. Similarly, investment concentration index relates positively with excess investment in the positive range and negatively in the negative range. The coefficient on investment concentration index is smaller in the positive range of excess investment in own BG firms. On the other hand, this coefficient is larger in the positive range when the dependent variable is excess investment in rivals. Thus, the coefficients on the investment concentration index present a picture that is consistent with our earlier inference that higher investment by BG funds in their own BG firms appears to be driven by opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, when BG funds invest more in rival firms, it seems to be more consistent with better skill/effort.
Concluding Remarks
The Indian mutual fund industry has the unique feature that a significant number of funds belong to business group families. These BG families are typically well-diversified conglomerates that comprise several other firms that operate in a wide range of industries. In other words, mutual funds are but a part of the typical BG. It is natural to assume that the managers of BG funds and BG firms have a relationship/network that could affect the investment and return performance of the BG fund. Specifically, the BG fund manager may have access to private information on the firms that belong to its own BG, the industries in which these BG firms operate, and the rivals of these BG firms. This informational advantage should lead to superior fund performance. On the other hand, the BG fund manager may also act opportunistically because of her relationship with the owner/managers of her BG firms. For example, the BG fund manager may owe her job to the BG firm owner/manager, may be related to him, or he may be in a position to affect her career. As a consequence of such possibilities, the BG fund manager may make portfolio choices and investment decisions that may benefit the BG firm owner/manager rather than fund investors. If the fund manager overweights own BG firm's stocks because of these motives, then we should see a non-positive relation between greater ownership in own BG firms and the fund's return performance.
In this paper, we investigate the above possibilities on a sample of Indian BG fund ownership and returns during the period 2002 -2010. We use a survivorship-bias free data of mutual funds during this period that was constructed by integrating several different sources.
Though we find a positive relationship between BG fund performance and their investments in own group firms and rivals (in excess of what a typical fund does), it is the underinvestment that seems to be driving most of this result. That is, funds that tend to underinvest in their group stocks or their rivals tend to underperform on a risk-adjusted basis. This result is robust to different measures for returns including the more objective 4-factor alphas and characteristic benchmark-adjusted returns. We find weak evidence that over investment in group firms and rivals also leads to underperformance. This suggests that the relationship between performance and excess investment is like an inverted "V" where funds underperform whenever they increase or decrease their investment in group firms or rival firms beyond what a typical fund invests in these firms.
While underinvestment in group firms can be attributable to opportunistic motives, especially in the face of regulatory restrictions capping the maximum amount that can be invested in all group securities, it is puzzling to see why BG fund managers leave money on the We also show that, the degree of investment concentration of the BG fund's portfolio, which is suggested by the literature as a measure of managerial ability/effort, relates positively with the level of ownership in its BG firms' rivals. However, we also find evidence that suggests opportunistic behavior on the part of BG fund managers. When a BG fund invests more in its own BG firms than a typical fund, there is a significantly negative relation between this ownership level and the fund's return. We also find a negative relation between the fund's ownership in its own BG firms and the portfolio's investment concentration ratio which also suggests a lack of managerial ability/effort. The obvious implication of our findings for investors in BG mutual funds is that they should pay closer attention to the fund's investments in its own firms and in their rivals. Bank of India while critics call for caution in the face of obvious conflicts of interest. Our results, using the mutual fund experience, suggest that sensible regulations and tight monitoring could resolve some of these conflicts.
11 Source: NDTV Report, August 28, 2012. The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE) are the two most significant stock exchanges in India, and together account for a vast majority of equity trades. The BSE's key index is the SENSEX, which comprises of 30 largest and most actively traded companies on the BSE. The NSE's key index is the CNX Nifty, known as the NSE NIFTY, which is made up of fifty major stocks weighted by their market capitalization.
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See Schedule Five of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Mutual Funds) Regulations of 1996. 13 We checked the prospectuses of some BG funds and found that they cite the SEBI code of conduct almost verbatim. However, we could not find any discussion of what the fund will do with respect to investments in its own BG firms or about any conflicts of interest that may arise because the fund is a part of a diversified BG fund family. Table 1 Summary Statistics This table presents the summary statistics of a survivorship-bias free sample of 367 Indian equity mutual funds during the period 2002 -2010.The statistics are presented separately for Business group (BG) owned funds (118 funds) and for non-Business group owned funds (249 funds). BG affiliation for funds and firms they invest in are derived from CMIE's Prowess database. Mutual fund data are primarily obtained from ICRA and are supplemented with data from individual fund datasheets, and other sources reported in the main text of the paper. Fund net inflow is the product of the difference between closing and opening assets under management with 1+fund return for the month, as a percentage of opening assets under management. Characteristic-adjusted return is based on the methodology followed in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) while the 4-factor alpha is based on Carhart (1997). Fund investment concentration index (Herfindahl) is computed as the sum of squares of portfolio weights of the fund's equity investments. % Debt holdings include short-term debt and cash. Excess investment in BG firms by BG funds represents the difference in the percentage of assets invested by a BG fund over a typical fund. BG rivals are non-BG firms that belong to the same industry in which the business group operates. ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Table 4 Herding Behavior Among Funds Belonging to the Same Business Group Family
This table presents the degree to which different funds belonging to the same group family herd in their investment strategies, especially when it comes to investing in their group firms or rival firms (non-group firms that belong to the same industry). We calculate the percentage of family funds (both equally-weighted and AUM-weighted) that are either over-invested, under-invested or with no investment in each group stock, or its rival in the same industry, compared to an average mutual fund. We compute this measure first for each stock for a given month and then average across stocks either using equal weights or using their market capitalization. We then compute a simple average across months to present the percentage of funds that overinvest, underinvest and not invest at all in their own stocks or in their rivals for each fund family. 
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